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Exploring Market Making Strategy for High
Frequency Trading: An Agent-Based Approach
Yibing Xiong, Takashi Yamada, and Takao Terano
Abstract This paper utilizes agent-based simulation to explore market making
strategy for high frequency traders (HFTs) and tests its performance under com-
petition environments. After proposing a model representing HFTs’ activities in
financial market when they act as market makers, we carry out simulations to
explore how order price and order quantity affect HFTs’ profits and risks. As the
result, we find that offering prices around last trading price, as well as taking
advantage of order imbalance, increases HFTs’ returns. On the other hand, our
results show utilizing adaptive order size based on previous order execution rate and
setting a net threshold based on average trading volume helps to control the risks of
end-of-day inventory. In addition, we introduce the competition environments of
increased competitors and decreased latency, so as to see how these factors affect
the performance of market making strategy.
6.1 Introduction
On March 11th, 2014, Virtu Financial Inc., the high frequency market maker, who
had just one day of trading losses in 1238 days, filed for an initial public offering.
Many people were astonished by their near-perfect record as a market maker, while
others argued that the profit is becoming unsustainable due to competitions. In
this paper we address two questions: what kind of market making strategy helps
to increase HFTs’ profit, and how this strategy performances under competition
environments?
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) generalized four types of
trading strategies that often utilized by HFTs [1]. Among them, market making is the
most transparent one and constitutes more than 60 % of HFT volume [2]. Menkveld
carefully studied the profits and net position of a large HFT who acts as a modern
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market maker [3]. But the strategies under the performance of this HFT, as well as
the relationship between strategy and market condition, remains unrevealed.
The formidable challenge for better revealing HFT activities, is obtaining
comprehensive and detailed data. Agent-based simulation provides an effective
way to solve this problem, and has already been used to design trading strategies.
Kendall and Su use an agent-based model to evolve successful trading strategies
by integrating individual learning and social learning [4]. Nevmyvaka et al. use a
simple class of non-predictive trading strategies to test electronic market making,
and examine the impact of various parameters on the market maker’s performance
[5]. Wang et al. implement a learning algorithm for market makers to search the
optimal trading frequency, and they study how different trading frequencies of
market makers affect the market [6]. Wah and Wellman employ simulation based
methods to evaluate heuristic strategies for market makers and find the presence
of the market maker is benefit to both impatient investors and overall market [7].
Comparing with their approaches, our agent-based simulation focuses on testing the
combinations of different classes of market making strategies for HFTs, and further
examining the performance in competitive environments. Our main contributions
are as follows:
• We build an artificial transaction system to represent HFTs’ activities in stock
market when they act as market makers. This system fits with main statistical
properties of financial markets and is used to compare the performance of
different market making strategies.
• We find one market making strategy which increases daily return and decreases
end-of-day inventory, is offering prices around last trading price, as well as
take advantage of order imbalance, together using adaptive order size based
on previous order execution rate and a net threshold based on average trading
volume.
• We further introducing the environment of increased competitors and decreased
latency, in order to test the strategy under different market conditions.
6.2 Modelling of High Frequency Trading
In this section, we propose an artificial stock market in which agents trade through
a limit-order book (LOB). Agents are classified into two categories according to
their goals and strategies. The one is Low Frequency Traders (LFTs), who concern
the value of the asset and try to earn the profit using an integrated strategy of
fundamentalist and chartist. The other is High Frequency Traders (HFTs), who
ignore the value of the asset but only pay attention to the trading environment itself,
and they mainly try to accumulate the profit on the spread using the market making
strategy. We stimulate the intra-day transaction scenario where both agents trade
on one single asset. The framework of the model are presented first, following by
details.
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6.2.1 Framework
The model is an extension of the one presented by Leal et al. [8]. There are totally
T sessions in each of which both HFTs and LFTs trade. The trading procedure is as
follows:
1. Active LFTs decide whether to enter the market according to their expected
returns. If enter, they submit either a sell or a buy order with size and price based
on their expectations.
2. Knowing the orders submitted by LFTs, HFTs decide whether to enter the
market. If enter, they usually submit both a sell and a buy order with size and
price in order to absorb the orders of LFTs and earn the profit on the spread.
3. LFTs and HFTs’ orders are matched and executed according to their price and
arrival time. the last trading price is determined then and unexecuted orders rest
in the LOB for the next trading session.
4. After each session, LFTs and HFTs decide whether to update their trading
parameters according to their performances.
6.2.2 Low Frequency Traders Activity
For each trading session, LFT i acts as following:
1. Decides whether to be active according to its active possibility LFi_ap.
LFi_ap is drawn from a uniform distribution with support Œ˛Lmin; ˛
L
max and may
be changed according to individual profit.
2. If being active, LFT i first calculates the expected price of the asset LFi_EP based
on its expected return LFi_ER, then generates the ask price LFi_APt and bid price
LFi_BPt at time t based on last trading price pt.
The return at time t are defined as
Rt D log. pt
pt1
/ (6.1)
Utilizing the idea of LeBaron and Yamamoto [9]. LFTs form their weighted
forecasts on the future returns by combining fundamental-, chart-, and noise-
based forecasts as follows:
LFi_ER D ni1  log.
pf
pt








/ C ni3  N.0; 1/ (6.2)
and the expected price LFi_EP is calculated as pt  eLFi_ER.
li represents the memory length of LFT i, and li  U.1; lmax/. ni1, ni2, ni3 are
weights for fundamentalist, chartist, and noise-induced components for LFT i,
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respectively, and randomly assigned according to normal distributions: ni1 
jN.0; 1/j, ni2  N.0; 2/, and ni3  N.0; 3/.
And price for sell/buy orders at time t are formed as follows:
LFi_APt D pt1  .1  Li /
LFi_BPt D pt1  .1 C Li / (6.3)
where i  U.min; max/ represents the price fluctuation parameter.
3. If the ask price of LFT i is higher than its expected future price, LFT i will submit
a sell order at price LFi_APt with size LFi_AS; if the bid price of LFT i is lower
than its expected future price, it will submit a buy order at price LFi_BPt with
size LFi_BS. The valid time of the order is L.
The size of the orders are proportional to expected returns and are formed as:
LFi_AS D LFi_ER  Li
LFi_BS D LFi_ER  Li (6.4)





max/, it can be changed according to individual profit. And if the order
has not been fully executed within L, the rest of it will be removed from the
LOB.
4. After  sessions, LFT i decide whether to update its trading parameters based on
its profit LFi_Pt.
if LFi_Pt > 0, LFT i will update some of its parameters as:
LFi_ap  U.LFi_ap; ˛max/ Li  U.Li ; Lmax/
if LFi_Pt 6 0, it becomes:
LFi_ap  U.˛min; LFi_ap/ Li  U.Lmin; Li /
if LFi_Pt 6 0 and a random number  UŒ0; 1 < , then the component-
weighted parameters and memory length will be renewed based on the distri-
butions:
ni1  jN.0; 1/j, ni2  N.0; 2/, ni3  N.0; 3/, and li  U.1; lmax/.
6.2.3 High Frequency Traders Activity
For each trading session, HFT j acts as follows:
1. HFT j decides whether to be active based on the price fluctuation Pflut (bps) at
time t and its action threshold HFj_at.
Since evidence suggests HFT activities prefer higher volatility. We calculate
Pflut D jpt1  pt2pt1 j  10; 000 (6.5)
and HFj_at  U.˛Hmin; ˛Hmax/. If Pflut > HFj_at, then HFT j becomes active.
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2. If being active, it submits both a sell order at price HFj_AP with size HFj_AS
and a buy order at price HFj_BP with size HFj_BS. All orders from HFTs are
submitted in a random order, and the valid time of the orders is H .
Under the defaulted setting, HFj_AP D pt C Hj , HFj_BP D pt  Hj , H refers
to price fluctuation. While HFTs decide the order quantity based on the quotes
in the LOB. HFj_AS D HFj_BS D 0:5  .qb C qs/  Hj . Where qb (qs) refers
to the total size of buy (sell) orders in the LOB at this session, and H refers to
order absorption rate.
3. Like LFTs, after  sessions, HFT j decide whether to update Hj based on its
performance.
6.2.4 Model Validation
Table 6.1 lists the defaulted value of all the parameters. The number of sessions is
set as 400 for intra-day trading. There are 441 traders, and 2 % (9) of them are HFTs
[2]. Price and volume related parameters are calibrated to fit with market volatility
and liquidity condition respectively, while keeping the diversity of agents.
Table 6.1 Parameters in initial simulation
Description Symbol Defaulted
Number of trading sessions T 400
Number of traders N 441
Fundamental value pf 50
Tick size ts 0.01
LFT initial active possibility Œ˛Lmin; ˛
L
max [0.01, 0.1]
LFT max memory length lmax 30
LFT order price fluctuation ŒLmin; 
L
max [0.002, 0.01]
LFT order size fluctuation ŒLmin; 
L
max [200, 1000]
LFT order life L 10
LFT parameter evolution circle  30
LFT parameter evolution rate  0.3
Std of fundamental component 1 0.3
Std of chartists component 2 0.6
Std of noise-trader component 3 0.1
HFT percentage HFTper 2 %
HFT active threshold Œ˛Hmin; ˛
H
max [5, 5]
HFT order price fluctuation H 0.01
HFT order absorption rate ŒHmin; 
H
max [0.1, 0.5]
HFT order life H 1
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Autocorrelation function of returns
Fig. 6.1 Autocorrelation of return in HFT simulations








Autocorrelation function of the absolute returns
Fig. 6.2 Volatility clustering in HFT simulations
We check whether the model is able to account for the main stylized facts of
financial markets. The price movement generated by the model is in line with the
empirical evidence as absence of autocorrelation, see as Fig. 6.1. In contrast, the
autocorrelation function of absolute return display a slow decaying pattern, see as
Fig. 6.2. In addition, the existence of fat tails in the distribution of price is shown in
Fig. 6.3.
6.3 Exploration of Market Making Strategy
In this section, we design experiments concerning HFT order price, order quantity
respectively, trying to find what kind of order price and order quantity help HFTs
increasing profits and decreasing risks.
Based on [3], our model assumes HFTs usually utilize passive market making
and try to earn the spread. But when they speculated order imbalance by detecting
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Fig. 6.3 Return distribution in HFT simulations
Fig. 6.4 Passive and aggressive market making
the transaction trends of LFTs, they may utilize aggressive market making. In this
case they trade on quickly to get the profit from price movement, or close their
position. In the model, we consider HFT’s profit as the daily return, and the risk as
the end-of-day inventory. All transaction fees are ignored for simplicity.
6.3.1 Strategies for Order Price
HFTs switch between passive and aggressive market making. In usual case, HFT
use passive market making as a liquidity maker, and they quote either based on last
trading price or best ask/bid price to earn the spread. But when the volume difference
between ask and bid quoting becomes significant, i.e. when jqbqsj=.qbCqs/ is over
a threshold, they will adopt aggressive market making. In this case HFTs will either
quoting along with temporary trend to earn the profit based on the price movement,
or against it to take liquidity in order to adjust their position. Shown as Fig. 6.4.
When HFTs adopt passive market making and offer price around the last trading
price, the ask order is offered at pt C 0:5  k1 and bid order at pt  0:5  k1, where
k1 refers to the ask-bid spread in passive market making condition and its default
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value is twice the tick size. While offering price around the best ask/bid, they offer
ask order at best ask and bid order at best bid in the LOB.
While setting the threshold as 0.5, we suppose when jqb  qsj=.qb C qs/ > 0:5,
HFTs will adopt aggressive market making. If sell orders is much more than buy
orders, quoting along with the temporary trend means offering ask price at last
trading price pt and bid price at pt  k2, where k2 refers to the ask/bid spread in
aggressive market making condition. And quoting against with temporary trend
means offering ask price at pt C k2 and bid price at pt.
6.3.2 Strategy for Order Quantity
Another question need to be discussed for the strategy is order quantity. In order to
gain more profits and fewer risks, HFTs will consider two aspects, increasing the
chance of order fulfillment and keeping flat position accordingly.
For the first aspect, When HFTs utilizes passive market making, they are aiming
to absorb the orders submitted by LFTs and earn the spread. And when HFTs use
aggressive market making, they try to make profits base on the excess liquidity. All
HFTs will adaptively adjust their order quantity by calculating the average order
execution rate in past few sessions. Suppose rm and rh refer to the market order
execution rate and self order execution rate in past  sessions, so the order quantity
Q is decide by:
Passive W Q D min.qb; qs/  0:5  .rm C rh/
Aggressive W Q D jqb  qsj  0:5  .rm C rh/ (6.6)
For the second aspect, based on the previous work by Menkveld and Hendershott
[3, 10], we introduce a parameter named net threshold, denoted as NT to supervise
the net position of HFTs, denoted as np. Suppose Vi represents the trading volume
in session i and NT is proportional to average trading volume in first  periods, so






• When jnpj < 0:5  NT, it trades as usual.
• 0:5  NT 6 jnpj < NT, it applies price pressure and adjusts its quotes by one
tick size.
• When jnpj > NT, it stops one side (buy or sell) trading.
• a HFT’s max order size equals NT.
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6.3.3 Comparison of Strategies
In last two sections, we mentioned the strategies used for passive and aggressive
market making, as well as the method to control end-of-day inventory. We suppose
HFTs can use either single or combination of market making, so totally eight types
of quoting methods are list in Table 6.2.
Supposing 2 % of the traders are HFTs, all of them use a same quoting strategy,
selected from the list, together with adaptive order quantity and net threshold for
controlling inventory, and their orders are submitted in a random order. We test
the performance of these strategies focused on the daily return and end-of-day
inventory, denoted as EDI. After testing each strategy for 250 simulations, Fig. 6.5
shows the average return and inventory of these strategies.
EDI% D jnpj
NT
 100 % (6.8)
Table 6.2 List of quoting strategies
Strategy
Market conditions
.qb  qs/=.qb C qs/ > 0:5 .qs  qb/=.qb C qs/ > 0:5 Other
ask price bid price ask price bid price ask price bid price
last trading pt C 0:5  k1 pt  0:5  k1 pt C 0:5  k1 pt  0:5  k1 pt C 0:5  k1 pt  0:5  k1
ask/bid best ask best bid best ask best bid best ask best bid
trend-along pt C k2 pt pt pt  k2 NA NA
trend-against pt pt  k2 pt C k2 pt NA NA
last+along pt C k2 pt pt pt  k2 pt C 0:5  k1 pt  0:5  k1
last+against pt pt  k2 pt C k2 pt pt C 0:5  k1 pt  0:5  k1
ask/bid+along pt C k2 pt pt pt  k2 best ask best bid
ask/bid+against pt pt  k2 pt C k2 pt best ask best bid
Fig. 6.5 Comparison of
different market making
strategies
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According to the graph, we see that quoting based on best ask/bid price has
its advantage on inventory, which indicate this strategy has the lowest risk. While
quoting based on last trading price together using a temporary trend along strategy,
lead to the highest return for HFTs. Here, we choose the last+along strategy as the
benchmark for further experiments.
6.4 Experiments on Competition
In following simulations, we change the percentage of HFTs (2 % in previous
experiments) to see its influence. On the other hand, all HFTs submit their orders
in a random order in past experiments, which means they have similar latencies.
Considering HFTs are pursuing lower latency in order to run in front of their
competitors nowadays, we arrange different latencies for HFTs. In this case HFTs
submit their orders one after another in a fixed order, thus a HFT with lower latency
submits its orders earlier and is likely to have higher order execution probabilities.
6.4.1 Total Return of HFTs
We first consider the total return of HFTs. We concern how HFTs’ profit will be
affected by increased competitors and decreased latency. While all HFTs using the
last+along strategy, we adjust the number of HFTs, and run the simulation 250 times
for each different HFT percentage (0.5 %, 1 %, 1.5 %, . . . 5 %) first in similar then
in different latency settings. The total return of HFTs is calculated and shown in
Fig. 6.6:
There are two things interesting according to this result. On one hand, in both
latency conditions, the total return of HFTs first went up and then down. This may
because when the number of HFTs is small, HFTs do not fully absorb LFTs’ orders
and there are still surplus profit on the spread. But when this number becomes larger,
Fig. 6.6 Total return of HFTs
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HFTs suffer from position imbalance and need to pay the price to trade out of their
positions, thus causes a decline in their total return. On the other hand, the red curve
shows the condition that HFTs compete with each other on speed and have different
latencies. Comparing to the blue one, it indicates this competition actually decreases
HFTs’ total return when the number of HFTs is small but increases their total return
when the number is larger.
6.4.2 Individual Return of HFTs
We then turn to the individual return of HFT and concern the value of low-latency.
Supposing HFTs have different latencies, Fig. 6.7 depicts the return difference
among LFTs, normal HFTs and the fastest HFT.
In the result, the red curve shows the average individual return of HFTs, it
decreases with the increase of HFTs percentage and can be seen as the return of
a normal HFT. Since LFTs’ population is much more than HFTs’ and their average
return can be seen as zero, the red curve also illustrates the return difference between
a normal HFT and a LFT approximately, and can be taken as a reference for a LFT
to decide whether it is worth taking part in HFT. The green curve, on the other hand,
is calculated as the difference between the average and the highest return (return
of the HFT with the lowest latency). It can be interpreted as how much potential
profit can be earned for a normal HFT to become the fastest one by renewing its
devices or using co-location method. This chart may suggest that although the profit
for becoming a HFT decreases with the increase of HFTs, it is always profitable for
a HFT to pursue lower latency.
Fig. 6.7 Individual return of
HFTs
74 Y. Xiong et al.
6.5 Conclusions
This paper focuses on exploring market making strategy for High Frequency
Trading and consists of three parts. First we combine previous work and build
an intra-day transaction model based on limit order book to simulate the trading
activities of HFTs and LFTs. In addition, by analyzing both passive and aggressive
market making, we try to figure out what kind of order price and order quantity help
HFTs increasing their profits and decreasing their risks. Finally, we test the strategy
in competition environments including increased competitors and decreased latency,
in order to see its performance.
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